Melissus of Samos, a Presocratic Greek philosopher of the Eleatic School, was born probably no later than 470 BC. His works, fragments of which are preserved by Simplicius and attested by the evidence of Aristotle, are devoted to the defense of Parmenides’ doctrine. They were written in Ionic and consist of long series of argument. Being, he says, is eternal. It cannot have had a beginning because it cannot have begun from not-being, nor from being. It cannot suffer destruction; it is impossible for being to become not being, and if it became another being, there would be no destruction. According to Simplicius, he differed here from Parmenides in distinguishing being and absolute being. He goes on to show that eternal being must also be unlimited in magnitude, and, therefore, one and unchangeable. Any change whether from internal or external source, he says, is unthinkable; the One is unvarying in quantity and in kind. There can be no division inside this unity, for any such division implies space or void; but void is nothing, and, therefore, is not. It follows further that being is incorporeal, inasmuch as all body has size and parts. (Source)